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On January 21st, 2015, the strict monetary austerity regime of  the Euro Zone (EZ) was 
officially abandoned as the European Central Bank (ECB) launched the Quantitative 
Easing (QE) programme of  State bonds purchases on secondary markets. The European 
Court of  Justice’s attorney general has certified that the QE programme is not in contrast 
with the EZ Treaties, but it certainly breaches the established interpretation regarding the 
latitude of  the ECB room of  manoeuvre within its mandate. In November 201 the newly 
appointed European Commission has launched an investment programme, the most 
significant impact of  which is the message that, in principle, there can be a common pool 
of  resources for governments to spend off  the books of  the Excessive Deficit Procedure1. 
Also, the “flexibility” issue raised by Italy and France regarding timing and extent of  
application of  the fiscal rules vis-à-vis contingent macroeconomic conditions is no longer 
taboo, and a few steps forward have been made in that direction (albeit the pro-cyclical 
maze of  rules rests untouched). And of  course, a major political change took place in 
Greece and may affect the whole of  Europe. These seeds of  regime shift come from 
overwhelming pressure of  economic, social and political crises all across Europe, a 
widening divergence of  policy strategies with major partners and official institutions 
outside the EZ, and  the rapid decline of  support for the austerity doctrine from leading 
academic schools outside the “German block”. 
Is the European austerity doctrine dead, and can we forget about it? Not quite. We all 
understand that a fast boost to economic activity in the EZ cannot only come from 
monetary QE plus sparse domestic fiscal stimuli, whatever is the fiscal space to which each 
government is constrained by the Fiscal Compact or by investors. As argued by President 
Draghi at Jackson Hole, the road towards a satisfactory recovery rate in the EZ can only be 
opened by fiscal and monetary coordination at the EZ level, and this can only be accomplished if  
a fiscal stimulus is coordinated across countries from Brussels. This view calls into question the 
design of  the economic governance of  the EZ, of  which the austerity doctrine is as yet 
one of  the pillars.  
Awaiting for the United States of  Europe, it is urgent fixing the notorious asymmetry 
between the single monetary policy and 17 national fiscal policies in view of  more effective 
macroeconomic stabilization. As we shall argue, this reform does not need a full-blown 
federal system, nor deep fiscal solidarity, nor large fiscal transfers. More simply, the creation 
of  a fiscal policy board, a new “Ecofin 2.0”, with a clear mandate for fiscal policy 
coordination vis-à-vis the monetary policy stance of  the ECB2. Ideological and political 
resistance to take this step is myopic: if  we do not move now,  the hardship of  the 
European crisis will force us to move later at much higher cost.   
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Faulty foundations, faulty narratives 
 
It is largely agreed that the economic governance of  the EZ has to a large extent failed 
since the start of  the Great Recession (e.g. De Grauwe, 2013). From the foundational point 
of  view,  the key fault lies in two (pseudo-moral) doctrines: the austerity doctrine, and the 
national responsibility doctrine. It may be argued that these were the sine-qua-non pillars of  
the political agreement with Germany. Nonetheless, those pillars proved unable to generate 
a viable set of  institutions, rules and policy guidelines as made crystal clear by the first true 
“stress test”. 
Austerity policies3, supported by ever more complicated fiscal rules, proved to be pro-
cyclical (i.e. contractionary), contrary to the comforting belief  that fiscal consolidation in 
hard times is (or at least may be managed as to be) “growth friendly”. Worse, austerity 
failed even on the very basic front of  public finance problems.  Well-known examples of  
the failures of  the austerity doctrine can be seen in figures 1, 2 and 3.  
First, as shown by figure 1, from 2010 to 2103 in the early 12 EZ countries about 75% 
of  austerity episodes (as measured by positive changes in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance) occurred in a year with (large) negative output gap, that is when standard macro-
policy principles recommend expansionary policy measures. Since the monetary policy 
rates were almost at the zero lower bound (and the efficacy of  the single monetary policy 
can be uneven across country), that recommendation means active fiscal policy.  
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: Eurostat, database AMECO 
 
Second, GDP grew less and unemployment grew more (see figure2) in those countries 
that implemented stronger consolidation policies. Whether or not the latter  were also 
structurally weaker, any positive effect of  fiscal consolidation is hardly detectable. 
Finally, also the debt/GDP ratio grew more in those countries where stronger 
consolidation policies were enforced (see figure 3), proving that such policies have been 
ineffective even at pursuing their foremost target: reducing the debt/GDP ratios that had 
skyrocketed in 2009-2010 as a consequence of  widespread bail-outs of  financially 
distressed banks, GDP plummeting and some timid fiscal stimulus in 2009. The 
                                            
3 For an overall assessment for the whole Transatlantic area see Tamborini (2014). 
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explanation consistent with the above facts is that austerity has reduced GDP growth more 
than debt growth. 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Source: OECD 
 
  
Figure 3 
 
Source: OECD 
 
In front of  the failures of  austerity it has become commonplace blaming specific faults 
in weaker countries. Two are worth mentioning. One is that growth-unfriendly austerity is 
the result of  the wrong policy mix of  too large tax increases instead of  expenditure cuts. 
Yet, as shown by Tamborini (2014),  the austerity mix has poor statistical relationship with 
differences in growth performance.  Austerity has been obtained by raising taxes faster than 
expenditure almost everywhere except in the countries under the 'Troika' treatment, where the 
growth performance has been dramatically worse than elsewhere. 
Another key argument is the absence (or the excessively slow implementation) of  
“structural reforms”. Austerity failed - the argument goes - where the governments failed 
to do their homework correctly. That is, where governments did not comply with the 
Berlin-Brussels-Frankfurt consensus about national labour market reforms in order to: 
lowering real wages; adopting pro-competition policies to reduce mark-ups and therefore 
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prices of  tradable goods and non-tradable services, etc. Only structural reforms – the 
mantra goes – can pave the road out of  this deep recession. Sure? Not so much4.  
To begin with, inspection of  standard labour market statistics does not lend much 
support to the structural reforms narrative in two respects.  The first is that there is not 
much evidence that labour markets have remained rigid in the face of  falling output and 
rising unemployment. From 2007 to 2013, real unit labour costs fell by 12.4% in Cyprus, 
10.5% in Greece, 5.8% in Spain, 3.3% in Portugal. The second is that differences in rigidity 
across countries amount to a thin explanation of  differences in unemployment 
performances.  
 
Figure 4 
 
Source: OECD Employment Protection Indicators, Eurostat, database AMECO 
 
Using the Employment Protection Indicators (EPI)5, we have elaborated a synthetic 
index for each applicable country based on two EPI: “Strictness of  employment 
protection; Individual and collective dismissal (regular contracts)” (version 3), and 
“Temporary employment” (version 3).  The index is the average of  the average value of  the 
two EPI from 2008 to 2013 (actually, EPI have remained constant or have changed very 
little in this period of  time). The relationship between this rigidity index and the change of  
unemployment is shown in figure 4. If   some countries with higher index display a greater 
increase in unemployment than do some countries with lower index, this pattern is far from 
providing an exhaustive explanation of  the differences in unemployment performance. 
True, the more flexible Anglo-Saxon economies have suffered relatively smaller increases in 
unemployment, but the majority of  the European economies, with much higher indices, 
have done no worse, or even better. Germany’s celebrated Hartz reforms have changed 
little its mid-EPI ranking, and yet its employment resilience has been vigorous. The much 
worse unemployment performance of  the EZ peripheral countries seems unrelated to 
significant differences in rigidity with respect to the other EZ partners. 
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Getting  the Euro Zone economics right 
 
Along the eighty years between the Great Depression and the Great Recession, we have 
learned that well-functioning market economies usually have public powers doing two 
things which free market forces may not do: create institutions granting market efficiency 
and social equity, and keep aggregate demand in line with supply. Radical deviations from 
this historical wisdom are essentially ideological, and have proved to be disruptive. 
Today’s elementary Macro textbooks carefully distinguish between a long run in which 
the supply side matters and a short run in which the demand side matters. Supply side 
structural reforms affect the long run potential output but only aggregate demand policies 
can in the short run fill the negative output gap due to financial crisis and consequent 
aggregate demand shortfalls. Elementary textbooks may be a little too harsh in separating 
the long from the short run. However, recent theoretical frontier-research (Eggertson, 
Ferraro and Raffo, 2014) has shown that structural reforms aimed at increasing potential 
output may become counter-productive in the short run when the economy is at the zero-
lower-bound (i.e. nominal interest rates are virtually zero and inflation is close to zero). 
Only strong real devaluations (due to lower labour costs and prices) may help inducing an 
export-led recovery in the periphery (Vogel, 2012, among others), provided those effects 
are perfectly anticipated, there is no financial accelerator and, of  course, reforms (which 
usually come in the form of  parliamentary acts or bills) actually have the desired impacts 
on the crucial variables. That is, the short run effects seem to be highly uncertain and 
probably not so quick to come about.  
Empirical research on the impact of  structural reforms is no longer unanimously 
enthusiastic. An important point made by an extended study by the IMF (2012) is that the 
cyclical position of  the economy and the concomitant policy stance do matter. In countries 
under fiscal adjustment, the relief  from structural reforms is reduced with respect to normal 
conditions. It may be quite modest and stretching over a decade. The interesting 
explanation put forward by this study is once again related to the output gap. In fact, if  the 
government is cutting aggregate demand and at the same time succeeds in spurring supply, 
the gap widens. Hence, the excess capacity that afflicts firms grows larger and stretches over 
time. But this runs counter the dogma of  rational expectations. If  entrepreneurs anticipate 
growing excess capacity why should they expand it now? Hence supply side policies 
without proactive demand side polices may be self-defeating. 
Not only does the “national responsibility” doctrine stand on such disputable economic 
bases. It is also more profoundly flawed as a normative principle. Responsibility implies 
free will and full ability to take, or not to take, a determinate course of  action. And on the 
other hand, a given state of  affairs can be attributed to someone's responsibility if  such a 
state is unequivocally and exclusively the result of  his/her will and actions. These 
conditions can hardly hold when we move from individuals to “nations” and their 
governments in a highly interdependent world.  
Take as an example the unwinding of  the so-called “macroeconomic imbalances” across 
the EZ in the years prior to the financial crisis of  2007-08. It is well documented that the 
current-account surpluses with net foreign lending of  the Continental countries were the 
mirror image of  the current-account deficits with net foreign borrowing of  the Shore 
countries6. This is a notorious chicken-and-egg puzzle, which has no firm scientific 
solution, since it is the result of  widely dispersed market forces that no one can control in 
                                            
6 Geographically not all the net borrowing countries (e.g. Portugal and Ireland) were in the South of Europe 
as is usually said. Instead, for some unknown reason, they all were along the European sea borders.  
6 
their entirety. The imbalances were largely originated by the private sectors, with public 
sectors in slight deficit or close to balance. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) argued that those 
imbalances were not a problem, quite the contrary they were the evidence that free capital 
movements were doing their job. Later Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) explained that the 
imbalances turned out to be a problem because capital inflows were badly used for 
unproductive uses. Prof. H. W. Sinn (2014) loves to say that a party was going on in the 
South. One can also say that the North was bringing the bottles. Europe wanted free 
capital movements because of  the widespread faith in the allocative efficiency of  private 
investors. Governments have little, indeed zero, control on them. And “nations” are a void 
concept in economics: good or bad uses of  resources by way of  markets is matter of  
individual responsibility. Yet governments had to intervene to bail out private lenders and 
borrowers under threat of  disastrous default à la Lehman taking the threat onto 
themselves. Where does the responsibility lie? Is there any sense in the statement that 
macroeconomic imbalances were, or always are, matter of  “national responsibility”? 
The story of  rebalancing the imbalances is alike. Each country doing its own homework 
independently of  the others is no solution to the problem. And a country’s failure in doing 
homework, or getting the expected results, may not only be its own responsibility. For 
instance, a well-entrenched view is that the EZ should work as the gold standard regime, 
where “gold” is the stock of  euros created by the ECB (e.g. Sinn, 2014). In this view, deficit 
countries lose “gold” (Target 2 balances) and should rebalance by regaining 
competitiveness through internal deflation (thus the insistence on structural reforms). Yet 
the classical theory of  the gold standard says that surplus countries which receive excess 
gold contribute to rebalancing by way of  internal inflation. If  this does not happen, all the 
burden is shifted onto the deficit countries, and if  this is too large, the mechanism breaks 
down. Who is responsible?  
Asking the EZ deficit countries to pursue their GDP recovery through a deep real 
devaluation (largely under way with little results) amounts to implying that the pursuit of  
competitiveness is the duty of  each member country. However, as Paul Krugman noted: 
“if  we look at the whole period from 1999 to the present, most of  Europe has had cost 
growth and inflation just about consistent with the ECB’s long-standing just-under-2 
percent inflation target”. And more recently: “what we see is that Italy is somewhat out of  
line - but the real standout is Germany, which has had much too little wage growth. And 
this in turn suggests that if  we’re looking for the key to European problems, it lies in 
Germany’s beggar-they-neighbour relative wage deflation” Paul Krugman7. 
 
Figure 5 
 
Source: Paul Krugman  
                                            
7 See also Francesco Saraceno; Simon Wren-Lewis. 
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German economists, and the public opinion at large, reject this argument as almost 
offensive. We are the most competitive manufacturing country in the Western world, they 
argue, we are not the problem, and you cannot ask us to be less competitive to help lazy 
countries. This reaction may even be understandable, but it reveals where the problem of  
rebalancing the imbalances lies. Rebalancing by way of  external competitiveness is a zero-
sum game or, as said above, there cannot be un-coordinated, non-cooperative solution. 
This was indeed the hard lesson that international reformers at Bretton Woods drew from 
the collapse of  the gold standard regimes in the inter-war years.  
Today, any macroeconomic textbook teaches that the overall aggregate demand within a 
currency area is the weighted average of  the surpluses and deficits of  its member states. As 
well-known in Brussels, with a surplus above 6% of  its GDP, Germany is presently 
violating the Six Pack article tackling the “composition problem”, that is the obligation to 
revive domestic demand for a country that causes the other countries’ current account 
deficit by suckling their domestic demand.  
Can smooth rebalancing be entirely engineered by the ECB? The more aggressive QE 
announced by the ECB may help, but Mr. Draghi is right in warning that the ECB room of  
manoeuvre is almost exhausted. not so much for the formal opposition of  the 
Bundesbank, as for the practical beggar-thy-neighbour policy in which the EZ is entrapped. In 
a monetary union, given the general monetary stance, differences in demand and price 
paths across countries depend on local demand management. Hence, though the pressure 
by Brussels to keep austerity tight is being relaxed, the EZ is still entrapped in the vicious 
circle where it fell in 2010 and 2011, when it took the road down towards its own double-
dip, diverging from the path of  all other non-EZ areas. Deficit countries have experienced 
again in 2014 the dangerous situation whereby the risk of  default could be fuelled by 
disappointing growth, with the possibility that a contagion effect could renew a hike in the 
spreads also in countries on the right track towards more virtuous public finances. In this 
unfortunate case the negative externalities would come back, the blindness of  the “national 
responsibility view” would reach its climax. As aptly pointed out by Bastasin (2014), 
monetary policy independence, exclusive national responsibility, and irreversibility of  the 
euro make an inconsistent triplet: sooner or later any one out of  the three has to be 
dropped. 
 
Ecofin 2.0 
 
The design of  the EMU macroeconomic governance born in Maastricht has proved to 
be founded on shaky pillars. It should be out of  dispute that the ensuing policy 
mismanagement has prolonged and amplified the effects of  a crisis originated elsewhere. 
Insisting on faulty stories will not fix faulty foundations. 
What can, and should, genuine reformers do? As in any high politics operation, a unique 
combination of  vision, determination and brinkmanship is needed. First, to conquer 
mutual trust, it should be clear that the reform will not be a tricky system of  bypasses of  
the fiscal responsibilities, sovereignty limitations, and economic reforms that are necessary 
to live and prosper in Europe and in the euro. Second, the "democratic deficit" of  
European institutions at large should be taken very seriously: fiscal policy cannot and 
should not be delegated to technocratic entities behind the curtain of  pseudo-fixed rules. 
Fully fledged political and fiscal federalism can be shown to Pareto-dominate other 
institutional arrangements in a monetary union with labour mobility and asymmetric 
shocks (Baglioni, Boitani, Bordignon, 2015). However, within the present political 
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constraints, the United States of  Europe may well be a mirage, capable of  entrapping the 
Eurozone in a dangerous status quo. What is urgently needed is an effective system of  protection 
and stabilization against large economic and financial boom-bust cycles wisely articulated at the 
national and super national levels along the following lines. 
 
1. Complete redesign of  the fiscal regulation system: a) substitution of  the “country-by-
country” approach with a system oriented towards coordination of  fiscal policies; b) 
removal  of  the apparatus of  fixed rules on current fiscal budgets, in favour of  direct 
monitoring of  long-term sustainability of  public debt; c) flexibility of  long-term fiscal 
plans in relation to the business cycle, domestically and Union-wide, under peer monitoring 
and coordination; d) transfer of  a few national fiscal competences (e.g. defence, 
supranational infrastructural investments, automatic stabilizers, such as unemployment 
benefits) to the Union’s budget, under the control of  the European Parliament, which may 
be the germ of  a fiscal union. 
 
2. Institution of  a newly conceived “Ecofin 2.0”, a board of  national fiscal authorities 
with a clear mandate to implement the new fiscal rules and coordinate Union-wide fiscal 
policy in view of  stabilization of  the aggregate business cycle vis-à-vis the monetary policy 
stance of  the ECB. The board should also have a clear and transparent agenda and a 
system of  majority voting. This does not guarantee that the divergent policy interests of  
the German block with the rest of  the EZ can be overcome, but that, as it happened with 
the ECB architecture, negotiations will be clear and transparent, not predetermined under 
the shield of  fixed rules, so that alternative views may have a chance. 
 
3. Realignment of  the ECB statute and latitude of  competences in line with those of  
standard central banks in developed countries (remove prohibitions that are not 
enforceable when they may endanger the stability of  the system). 
 
Last but not least, genuine reformers will need the credible determination to present all 
the others with a clear-cut alternative: either a serious reform is started here and now, with 
all the necessary ingredients, those which the South dislikes as well as those which the North 
dislikes, or everyone will have to take its own share of  responsibility in saying ‘No’ to the 
European economic and monetary union.  
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